Burt v. Burt : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Burt v. Burt : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John T. Caine; Richards, Caine & Allen; Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent.
Pete N. Vlahos; F. Kim Walpole; Vlahos, Sharp, Wight & Walpole; Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Burt v. Burt, No. 890190 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1738
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FOP THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID BURT, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
BETTY MAE BURT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE NO: 890190-CA 
PRIORITY: 14b 
An Appeal from a Judgment of the Second 
Judicial District Court of 
Weber County, State of Utah 
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, Presiding 
PETE N. VLAHOS, #3337 
F. KIM WALPOLE, #4510 
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & WALPOLE 
Legal Forum Building 
24 47 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(801) 621-2464 
Attorneys for 
Defendant/Appellant 
JOHN T. CAINE, #0536 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(801) 399-4191 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
David Burt, Plaintiff and Respondent. 
Betty May Burt, Defendant and Appellant. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 7 
ARGUMENTS 8 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAS ABUSED ITS DIS-
CRETION IN ITS DIVISION OF THE MARITAL 
PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES 8 
POINT 1(a). 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO MAKE AN AWARD OF SURVIVOR 
ANNUITY BENEFITS OF THE RESPONDENT TO 
THE APPELLANT 
POINT 1(b). 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO CONSIDER THE RESPONDENT'S 
RETIREMENT AS PART OF THE PROPERTY 
DIVISION BY ESSENTIALLY AWARDING TO THE 
RESPONDENT HIS ENTIRE RETIREMENT 11 
POINT 1(c). 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO CONSIDER THE PRE-MARITAL 
MONEY THE APPELLANT HAD PAID INTO THE 
MARITAL HOME AND IN FAILING TO AWARD 
ONE-HALF OF THAT MARITAL HOME TO THE 
APPELLANT 13 
POINT 1(d) . 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FINDING THAT THE MONIES OBTAINED FROM 
THE RESPONDENT'S SALE OF A BOAT, TOYOTA 
TRUCK AND SNOWMOBILE WERE INCLUDED IN 
HIS BANK ACCOUNTS WHEN NO TESTIMONY WAS 
GIVEN'TO INDICATE THAT THAT IS WHERE THE 
MONIES HAD GONE FROM THE SALES 
POINT 1(e). 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN ITS PROPERTY DIVISION BY CONSIDERING 
THE NON-CO-MINGLED AND TRACEABLE 
SEPARATE INHERITANCE PROPERTIES OF THE 
PARTIES IN ITS FINAL AWARD OF PROPERTY... 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING TO THE APPELLANT THE SUM OF 
$300.00 AS AND FOR ALIMONY AFTER FINDING 
AN $851.00 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE INCOME 
OF THE APPELLANT AND THE RESPONDENT 
POINT III. 
THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
POINT IV. 
CONCLUSION 
ADDENDUM 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITATIONS 
Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987)... 
Agent v. Agent, 604 P.2d 862 (Okla. Ct. App. 
19 79) 
Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) 
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) 
Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1247 (Utah 
19 78) 
Heltman v. Heltman, 511 P.2d 720 (Utah 1973).. 
Hussey v. Hussey, 312 S.E.2d 267 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 1984) 
In Re Marriage of Ketcalf, 598 P.2d 1140 
(Mont. 1979) 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 
1988) 
24, 26 
Newmeyer v. Nevmieyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 
(Utah 1987) 
Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 97, 100 (Utah 
1986) 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 
1988) 
Pucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 
19 79) 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987) 
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 
988) 
Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83, 84 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) 8, 9 
T.R.F. v Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) 16 
Western Kane County Special Service District 
No. 1 v Jackson Cattle Company, 744 P.2d 1376 
(Utah 1987) 16 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 
1982) 11 
Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406, 408 
(Utah 1983) 9 
STATUTES CITED 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article 
VIII, Section 1 1 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3 33, 34 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5 12, 23 
24 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5 (1) 13 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5 (6) 12 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 1 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) 2 
RULES CITED 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) 9 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID BURT, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
BETTY MAE BURT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE NO: 890190-CA 
PRIORITY: 14b 
An Appeal from a Judgment of the Second 
Judicial District Court of 
Weber County, State of Utah 
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, Presiding 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article V11I, 
Section 1, et seq. , and the Judicial Code of the Utah Code 
Annotated, in particular § 78-2a-3 entitled "Court of 
Appeals Jurisdiction1', which states as follows: 
(2) The Court of Appeals has 
appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, 
over: 
(h) appeals from district court 
involving domestic relations cases, 
including but not limited to divorce, 
annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, 
and paternity; 
This appeal is from the District Court of Weber County 
and involves a domestic relations case including those 
issues delineated in the Utah Code Annotated § 
78-2a-3 (2) (h). Therefore, this Court has appellate juris-
diction. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an action wherein the Plaintiff/Respondent, who 
is the husband, brought an action for divcrce against the 
wife, who is the Defendant/Appellant, in the Second Judicial 
District Court of Weber County, wherein ultimately a Decree 
of Divorce was granted to the parties with a division of the 
marital property and an award of alimony- There were minor 
children born of the parties who were all emancipated as of 
the time of the divorce so that there are no issues concern-
ing child support, child custody or visitation, but the 
issues essentially evolve around a division of property and 
an award of alimony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented by this appeal are: 
1. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in making 
a final property division for the following reasons: 
(a) Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in 
failing to make an award of survivor annuity benefits of the 
Respondent to the Appellant. 
(b) Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in 
failing to consider the Respondents retirement as part of 
the property division when it essentially awarded to the 
Respondent his entire retirement. 
(c) Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in 
failing to consider the pre-marital money the Appellant had 
paid into the marital home of the parties, and in failing to 
award one-half of that marital home to the Appellant, which 
home was fully paid for by March of 1973. 
(d) Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in 
finding that the monies obtained when the Respondent sold 
the boat, Toyota truck and snowmobile and were included in 
the bank accounts when no testimony was given to indicate 
that that is where the monies had gone from the sales. 
(e) Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in its 
property division by considering the non-co-mingled and 
traceable separate inheritance properties of the parties. 
2. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in 
awarding to the Appellant the sum of $300.00 as and for 
alimony after finding an $851.00 difference between the 
income of the Appellant and the Respondent. 
3. Is the Appellant entitled to attorney's fees and 
costs on appeal. 
_^_ 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant and Respondent were married on the 5th 
day of March, 1947, in Idaho Falls, State of Idaho, with a 
marriage at the time of their divorce of almost 42 years. 
(See TR p. 1). • 
The parties had two children born as issue of their 
marriage, both of whom had reached the age of majority by 
the time of the trial and were emancipated. (See TR p. 1, 
Trans, p. 58). 
The parties had jointly acquired real estate and 
personal property. The Defendant/Appellant had up to 1984 
at various times received an inheritance of approximately 
$71,600.00, which the Appellant continually maintained, as 
acknowledged by the Respondent at the time of trial, as her 
separate property with no co-mingling with the marital 
assets of the parties. (See Trans, pp. 94-98, 127, 178, 
244-241) . 
The Respondent worked as an employee of the Federal 
government to the point of obtaining a net federal retire-
ment by the time of the divorce of $1,350.00 per month, with 
an additional income of $616.00 for a total of $1,966.00 per 
month. (See Trans, pp. 61, 72, 73, 76, 107, 111, 116-119). 
The Appellant received $415.00 from Soci_al Security, 
$515.00 from interest and dividends, and $185.00 a month 
from an Individual Retirement Account, with a total monthly 
earning of $1,115.00 per month. (See Trans, p. Ill, Defen-
dant1 s Exhibit 15). 
The Appellant filed a divorce Complaint as the Plain-
tiff on April 24, 1987, and three days thereafter the 
Respondent filed a divorce Complaint as the Plaintiff on 
April 27, 1987. Thereafter the two cases were consolidated 
with the Appellant being listed as the Defendant and the 
Respondent being listed as the Plaintiff. (See TR. pp 1-8). 
Thereafter, an Order to Show Cause was brought with a 
Recommended Order, with Objections to the Recommended Order, 
with eventually a Recommended and Stipulated Order on Order 
to Show Cause being entered granting temporary orders to the 
parties. (See TR pp. 21-38). 
A pre-trial settlement conference was held between the 
parties with Financial Declarations being submitted, 
proposed settlements, a Recommended Pre-Trial Order and 
Objections to the Recommended Pre-Trial Order being entered 
and this case was set for trial. (See TR pp. 41-78). 
The parties went to trial on January 20, 1988, exactly 
one year after their separation of January 20, 1987. (See 
Trans, p. 64 & TR pp. 83-94). 
The Trial Court took the matter under advisement and 
rendered a Memorandum Decision on February 8, 1989. (See TR 
pp. 96-98) . 
Based upon the Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce were prepared 
by Respondent's counsel, approved as to form by Appellant's 
counsel with some changes, and ultimately signed by the 
Trial Judge on March 2, 1989. (See TR pp. 99-105). 
A comparison between the parties incomes would show a 
disparity of $851.00 a month between the parties with the 
Trial Court awarding to the Appellant the sum of $300.00 per 
month as and for alimony. (See TR p. 102). 
Numerous exhibits were presented and admitted and 
testimony was given as to the real and personal property of 
the parties and their values, including the inheritances of 
the Appellant and of the Respondent and the inheritance 
values as monies separate and apart from these used for 
ordinary family living expenses. Exhibits and testimony 
were also given as to each of the parties respective earn-
ings and employment, including a survivor annuity benefit of 
the Respondent's retirement, (See Exhibits 4, 11-19, Trans, 
pp. 74-85, 94-97, 106, 119, 127, 240-245, 252, & 257). 
The Trial Court found that the Respondent had sold the 
boat, snowmobile and Toyota truck, and determined that the 
money obtained from those sales were included in the bank 
accounts which were ultimately awarded to the Respondent, 
yet no testimony was offered as to the monies of the sale 
of Mi^ Toyota or lo;»<i! or snowmobile going into the savings 
accounts ultimately awarded to the Respondent. (See Trans. 
pp. 191-193, 249-251, Exhibit #18). 
The Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal on the 2 8th 
day of March, 1989, to this Court. ( -<s.t TR pp. ^05-119). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Trial Court has abused its discretion in its 
division of the marital property of the parties. 
(a) The Trial Court abused its discretion i n failing 
to make an award of survivor annuity benefits of the respon-
dent to the Appellant. 
(b) The Trial Court abused its discretion in failing 
to consider the Respondent's retirement as part of the 
property division by esentially awardiiig to the Respondent 
his entire retirement. 
(c) The Trial Court abused its discretion in failing 
to consider the pre-marital money the Appellant had paid 
into the marital home and in failing to award one-half of 
that marital home to the Appellant. 
(d) The Trial Court abused its discretion in finding 
that the monies obtained from the Respondent's sale of a 
boat, Toyota truck and snowmobile were included in his bank 
accounts when no testimony was given to indicate that that 
is where the monies had gone from the sales. 
(e) The Trial Court abused its discretion and its 
property division by considering the non-co-mingled and 
traceable separate inheritance properties of the parties. 
2. The Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding 
to the Appellant the sum of $300.00 as and for alimony 
after finding an $851.00 difference between the income of 
the Appellant and the Respondent. 
3. The Appellant is entitled to attorney !s fees and 
costs on appeal. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAS ABUSED ITS DIS-
CRETION IN ITS DIVISION OF THE MARITAL 
PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES. 
In a divorce proceeding, fl determining and assigning 
values to marital property is a matter for the Trial Court 
and this Court will not disturb those determinations absent 
a showing of clear abuse of discretion." Talley v. Talley, 
739 P.2d 83, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In making such 
orders, the Trial Court is permitted broad latitude, and its 
judgment is not to be likely disturbed, so long as it 
exercises its discretion in accordance with the standards 
set by this Court. Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 
1277 (Utah 1987). The Appellant bears the burden of estab-
lishing that the Trial Court violated those standards "or 
that the Trial Court* s f a c t u a J . f i n d i n g s \ i p o i i wl 1 :i c 1 1 the 
property division is grounded are clearly erroneous under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)", Additionally, assess-
ing the wei ght ai id credibility expert witness testimony 
is a matter for- the trier of fact. Yelderman v, Yelderman, 
669 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983) "[I]t is within the piovidence 
of the; fact finder to believe those witnesses or evidence it 
choses". Id, at 408 
The Trial Court did abuse i ts discretj on i r maki ng a 
division of the marital property concerning those issues as 
delineated in the following arguments. 
POINT I(a). 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO MAKE AN AWARD OF SURVIVOR 
ANNUITY BENEFITS OF THE RESPONDENT TO 
THE APPELLANT. 
The Trial Court in this matter was requested by the 
parties due to their failure with the limited exception of a 
few personal property items, to make an equitable division 
of the property acquired during tl le marriage, Pun-':.;::.: to 
Talley v. Talley, cited above, in a divorce proceeding the 
Trial Court is to determine and assign values to marital 
property and to make a division according to its discretion 
entering factual findings upon which the property division 
is grounded under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a). 
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In this case, after testimony by the Plaintiff that he 
had retired from Hill Air Force Base with 30 years of credit 
towards Civil Service Retirement in 1976, the Trial Court 
failed to enter any Findings of Fact pursuant to Rule 52(a) 
as to its consideration of survivor annuity benefit and a 
designation by the Plaintiff for that Civil Service Retire-
ment benefit to the Defendant or whether the Trial Court 
Judge was simply denying that benefit to the Defen-
dant/Appellant herein. There is no factual finding in 
either the Memorandum Decision nor the Findings of Fact 
prepared by Respondent's counsel as to the Trial Court's 
consideration of the survivor annuity benefit. The Trial 
Court failed to consider that marital asset under the 
property division, essentially all of which had been 
acquired during the parties1 42 year marriage with the 
exception of a year or two this constitutes a clear abuse of 
discretion on behalf of the Trial Court and requires that 
the case be remanded for entry of appropriate Findings of 
Fact in regards to the survivor annuity benefit. See Barker 
v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) wherein this 
Court held that under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure an 
appellant Court can set aside the factual findings if they 
are clearly erroneous and that it was irrelevant whether the 
case was one in equity or one at law. 
POINT 1(b). 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO CONSIDER THE RESPONDENT'S 
RETIREMENT AS PART OF THE PROPERTY 
DIVISION BY ESSENTIALLY AWARDING TO THE 
RESPONDENT HIS ENTIRE RETIREMENT. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the now oft cited case of 
Woodward v. Woodward, 6 5fi P.^d ' W ilil.ili I'tK/), specifically 
held, citing an earlier case of Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 
1247 (Utah 1978) as follows: 
...We emphasize the equitable 
nature of proceedings dealing with the 
family, pointing out that the court may 
take into consideration all of the 
pertinent circumstances. These circum-
stances encompass "all of the assets of 
every nature possessed by the parties, 
whenever obtained and from whatever 
source derived; and that this includes 
any such pension fund or insurance11. 
Id. at 1276. To the extent that Bennett 
v. Bennett, supra, may limit the ability 
of the court to consider all of the 
parties' assets and circumstances, 
including retirement and pension rights, 
it is expressly overruled. 
In the immediate case at hand, the Appel] ant based on 
the transcript as resisted by the Respondent, did specif-
ically ask for a division of the retirement he was currently 
receiving as a part of property distribi iti oi I A revi ew of 
the Memorandum Decision and the Findings of Fact, as in the 
previous argument fails to disclose any consideration by the 
Trial Court of the retirement benefits or a consideration of 
a division of that property as a marital asset accrued 
during the parties' marriage of 42 years. The Court did 
find the income of the Plaintiff/Respondent including his 
retirement to be $1,966.00 and did address the retirement as 
income to the Plaintiff, but failed to make any distribution 
of that retirement as a marital asset or marital property in 
the distribution thereof. It rather considered the retire-
ment income of approximately $1,300.00 in the Plaintiff's 
income and ordered the payment of alimony of $300.00 per 
month. Under Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(5) the alimony 
would automatically terminate upon the remarriage of the 
Appellant or would terminate under Utah Code Annotated § 
30-3-5(6) upon establishment by the Respondent that the 
Appellant was residing with a person of the opposite sex, or 
upon Appellant's death. 
The retirement accumulated should be treated as a 
marital asset and as personal property to be considered by 
the Court in its division of the property rather than as 
income with a possible, although the Findings of Fact failed 
to indicate this, award of part of that retirement to the 
Appellant through an alimony award that can terminate upon 
remarriage, death or cohabitation, conditions which are not 
applicable to a property division of a marital asset. 
Based upon the above and foregoing points of law, the 
fact that the retirement is a marital asset and should be 
distributed n q m t a b l y ,ui<l th* Ti i a i Court '"';; iailure to 
delineate through its findings of fact as required by Rule 
52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the Court's treat-
men t I :> f 11 i a 1 : in a i: i tal asset, the findings should be vacated 
or at least better delineated and the case remanded for 
further consideration by the Trial Judge. 
POINT I (c) . 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO CONSIDER THE PRE-MARITAL 
MONEY THE APPELLANT HAD PAID INTO THE 
MARITAL HOME AND IN FAILING TO AWARD 
ONE-HALF OF THAT MARITAL HOME TO THE 
APPELLANT. 
As cited earlier in Point 1(b), Englert v. Englert, at 
1276, the law essentially requires in a divorce action that 
all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties 
whenever obtained and from whatever source derived, should 
be considered by the divorce Court or Trial Court in arriv-
ing at an equitable distribution of the parties. 
Additionally, the Uta! I Code Annotated § 30-3-5(1) 
indicates that when a Decree of Divorce is rendered the 
Court may include in it equitable orders relating to the ... 
property,... 
In the immediate case at hand, testimony was given by 
both parties as to the purchase in 1953 of a mari * •.' home 
located at 3502 Polk which was the second home purchased by 
-1 1-
the parties, having previously purchased a home in which the 
Defendant/Appellant had invested $2,500.00 and the Plain-
tiff/Respondent had invested $800.00. When the first home 
was sold that money was converted to the second home along 
with other assets that were joined by the parties and some 
assistance from the parties1 parents. The second home was 
paid for in full in 1973 and continued to be the marital 
home of the parties until their separation January 20, 1987. 
This marital home was stipulated by the parties to a 
value of $65,000.00, with payments over a 20 year mortgage 
of approximately $100.00 a month which were paid by the 
Respondent while the Appellant made numerous improvements, 
including painting, recarpeting, structural additions and 
other refurbishing. 
The Trial Court in making its division of the "marital 
assets" failed to consider the Respondent's investments and 
contributions to the marital home and literally awarded the 
marital home free and clear to the Respondent with an offset 
of a $65,000.00 home which the Appellant had purchased in 
1987 from inheritance money. 
It is a clear abuse of discretion on the Trial Court's 
part to award to the Appellant no interest in the marital 
home acquired over a 20-30 year time period with capital 
improvements and other investments by both parties toward 
the upkeep of the marital home and to offset that against 
the home purchased after separation by the Appellant out of 
inheritance income that was entirely separate ai id apart from 
any marital assets. The inheritance issue and the Court's 
abuse of discretion in that matter are further delineated in 
Point I (e) 
Accordingly, this Court should remand the case ror 
reconsideration of the marital 1 lome as a mar:i ta] asse*. • -i 
for better delineation as to its consideration in the final 
property division as an asset acquired during the marriage 
to which the Appellant: is entitled in one-half, or better 
factual findings as to why the Trial Court felt, if in fact 
it did, that she was not entitled to one-half of that 
marital asset, or in tlle alternative as this Court has done 
on occasion, to propose its own resolution. 
POINT I(d). 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FINDING THAT THE MONIES OBTAINED FROM 
THE RESPONDENT'S SALE OF A BOAT, TOYOTA 
TRUCK AND SNOWMOBILE WERE INCLUDED IN 
HIS BANK ACCOUNTS WHEN NO TESTIMONY WAS 
GIVEN TO INDICATE THAT THAT IS WHERE THE 
MONIES HAD GONE FROM THE SALES. 
The Trial Court did consider in its Memorandum Decision 
and did specifically find that the Respondent did sell a 
Toyota truck for the sum of $2,250.00, a 16 foot Bellboy 
cabin boat with a 75 horsepower outboard motor, and 
snowmobile for $650.00 for a total of $2,900.00. The Trial 
Court did fail to address assessed values pursuant to the 
Appellant's exhibit for the boat of $1,100.00 and the 
snowmobile for $150.00, and failed to enter findings as to 
those values which constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Further, the Trial Court in its Memorandum Decision 
specifically found that there were additional items of value 
sold by the Plaintiff, including the boat, Toyota truck, 
etc., and found the value included in the bank accounts. A 
careful review of the transcript and documentary evidence 
submitted to the Court would not support a finding that the 
sums of money received from those marital assets were 
included in the bank accounts awarded to the Respondent. 
When a finding is against the weight of the evidence or if 
the Court is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that 
a mistake has been made, which is the case in regards to 
these personal property items, then the finding is clearly 
erroneous and the case should be remanded for further 
consideration. See State v. Walker, 743 P. 2d 191 (Utah 
1987) ; Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1 v 
Jackson Cattle Company, 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987) and T.R.F. 
v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The Trial Court further finds in its Memorandum Deci-
sion which was not included in the Findings of Fact ulti-
mately submitted and signed, that if the sums of money were 
not included in those accounts, meaning the savings ac-
counts, awarded to the Respondent, then there should be an 
equal division of those sums of money. Again, no finding 
was entered as to what the sums of money would constitute 
other than there was an agreement as to the $2,250.00 for 
the Toyota truck, and no findings were made as to the value 
of the boat and the snowmobile valued by the Appellant at 
$1,250.00 but sold by the Respondent for $650.00. 
Accordingly, due to a clear abuse of discretion on 
behalf of the Trial Court, the issue as to the boat, Toyota 
truck and the snowmobile should be remanded for the entry of 
property Findings of Fact and a determination by the Court 
as to whether or not those sums were actually included in 
the bank accounts when the record is void as to their 
inclusion in those accounts. Presumably they were not 
included but were monies simply received by the Respondent 
which should be awarded equally as marital assets. 
POINT I(e). 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
ITS PROPERTY DIVISION EY CONSIDERING THE 
NON-CO-MINGLED AND TRACEABLE SEPARATE 
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INHERITANCE PROPERTIES OF THE PARTIES IN 
ITS FINAL AWARD OF PROPERTY. 
The Trial Court found that "the marital financial 
arrangement of the parties was unique with the Defendant 
becoming employed part-time with minimal salary and the 
Plaintiff paying all of their living expense and the Defen-
dant spending her money as she pleased with her money to be 
offset by the Plaintiff's use of the watch repair money for 
his private use.11 The Trial Court further found that the 
arrangement continued on through the marriage even after the 
Defendant was working full time and in some years equalled 
his income, and after she had inherited a substantial sum 
from her parents. The Trial Court did give credit to the 
Defendant in finding that she had contributed to the house-
hold by making improvements to the house and buying furni-
ture, but further found that it did create a situation of 
what was hers was hers and what was his was theirs. The 
Court ultimately found that since "the support by Plaintiff 
allowed Defendant to invest, etc., without encroachment into 
the funds, the Court considers it only fair to allow Plain-
tiff to share in that increase." Accordingly the Trial 
Court awarded to the Plaintiff the family residence at a 
value of $65,000.00, his two savings account at a value of 
$28,509.00, and the personal property at a value of 
$8,644.00 for a total value in property of $102,153.00 less 
his inheritance of $7,400.00 for a net award of $94,753.00. 
Respondent was also awarded the interest that the parties 
held in the Respondent's mother's home, which was also an 
inheritance, valued at $50,000.00 to which he was entitled 
to a one-half interest with his brother for a total value in 
his mother's home of $25,000.00. 
The Court went awarded to the Appellant, her home with 
a value of $65,000.00, a violin with an agreed value of 
$6,500.00, a coin collection with an agreed value of 
$1,250.00, and personal property items with a value of 
$6,590.00 with a total value of property awarded to the 
Plaintiff of $195,340.00 of which $71,600.00 was deducted as 
separate property not subject to division for a net award of 
$123,740.00. 
Mathematical calculation comparing the figures would 
indicate a figure of $44,400.00 as a value of personal 
property not delineated. With an award of $65,000.00 for 
the home, $14,340.00 for personal property items specifical-
ly mentioned, $71,600.00 for an inheritance, for a total 
figure of $195,340.00, a difference of $44,400.00 remains as 
property interest awarded to the Appellant but not delin-
eated nor spelled out in the Memorandum Decision nor the 
Findings of Fact. These awards constitute in essence a 
total consideration by the Trial Court of the personal 
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property awarded to the parties with the exception of the 
three items mentioned in Argument Point I(d). 
A review of the 20 Exhibits, a majority of which 
represent documentary evidence as to the marital assets and 
inheritances of the parties, would indicate assets other 
than those considered by the Court in its Memorandum Deci-
sion. The Trial Court obviously did not address any assets 
for the Respondent other than those specifically delineated 
in the Memorandum Decision. As relates to the Appellant due 
to a lack of adequate findings of fact, neither the parties 
nor this Court can ascertain what the $44,400.00 represents. 
Other marital assets not considered by the Court 
consist of a share account of $2,300.00 for the Appellant, 
an IRA account of $36,000.00, both of which assets are 
separate and apart from any inheritance and are actually 
assets acquired during the marriage. The voluminous Exhib-
its would indicate an inheritance, including the home 
purchased by the Appellant for $65,000.00 in 1987, and 
numerous other assets consisting of the $71,600.00 original-
ly acquired, and approximately $103,000.00 in interest for a 
total of $174,600.00, while the testimony of the Defendant 
would indicate an increase of 3108,000.00. Nowhere does the 
Memorandum Decision or Findings of Fact address the amount 
of $174,000.00 or $179,000.00, although a calculation of the 
home purchased by the Defendant and the as yet undetermined 
sum of $44,400.00 would indicate an amount of $109,000.00 as 
inheritance money. But if this was the finding of the. 
Court, what of the share account and the $36,000.00 Indi-
vidual Retirement Account which were not inheritance but 
rather marital assets. Sidelining the confusion and the 
failure of adequate Findings of Fact in addressing these 
monetary amounts in the Memorandum Decision, the Trial Court 
further abused its discretion in awarding to the Respondent 
a portion of the Appellant's inheritance by denying her an 
interest in the marital home and the marital savings ac-
counts and the retirement of the Respondent by offsetting 
those amounts presumably against the inheritance and/or 
inheritance interest of the Defendant accumulated in 1969 
and various other years. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P. 2d 304 (Utah 1988) recently considered the 
issue of an equitable property division pursuant to a 
divorce concerning property acquired by one spouse by gift 
and/or inheritance during the marriage. 
In Mortensen v. Mortensen, supra, the parties were 
married on June 18, 1959, when they were 18 and 19 years of 
age, neither bringing any substantial assets into the 
marriage. Approximately 10 years later in 1969, the 
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husband's parents who owned a farm, organized a corporation 
to which they conveyed the farm and issued 50% of the stock 
to their five children in equal shares such that a Certifi-
cate of Stock bearing Mr. Mortensenfs name alone was issued 
to him for his 10% of the outstanding shares. Mrs. 
Mortensen had had no involvement with the corporation except 
that she served as its secretary for six months during which 
time she performed some nominal secretarial work. 
The Plaintiff brought an action for divorce and at the 
end of the trial the Court suggested to counsel for both 
parties that they attempt to agree on a division of the 
property and on the amount of child support and alimony, if 
any. Counsel agreed to do so, requesting the Court to guide 
them by deciding whether the shares of stock should be 
considered by them in their negotiation. The Trial Court in 
Mortensen ruled that the stock was property of the marriage 
and should be taken into consideration in dividing the 
marital property in a fair and equitable basis. Thereafter 
the parties stipulated to a division of property which gave 
all of the shares of stock to Mr. Mortensen but gave about 
two-thirds in value of the remaining property to Mrs. 
Mortensen, including the major asset of the home and lot 
which had been fully paid for. The stipulation was made 
subject to the right of the Defendant to appeal to the 
Supreme Court the Trial Court's ruling concerning the shares 
of stock. 
The Utah Supreme Court then cites to the Utah Code 
Annotated § 30-3-5 cited earlier which "tersely provides: 
fwhen a decree of divorce is granted, the court may include 
in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
and parties1." The Supreme Court further found that proper-
ty was nowhere defined in the Divorce Code. 
The Supreme Court then goes through an extensive and 
exhaustive review of the issue citing to numerous earlier 
decisions. 
The Utah Supreme Court cites to the case of In Re 
Marriage of Metcalf, 598 P.2d 1140 (Mont. 1979) by stating 
that: 
The rules that property acquired by 
gift or inheritance by one spouse should 
be awarded to that spouse on divorce 
unless the other spouse has, by his or 
her efforts with regard to the property, 
acquired an equity in it, does not apply 
when the property thus acquired is 
consumed, such as when a gift or an 
inheritance of money is used for family 
purposes. 
Further citation to Agent v. Agent, 604 P.2d 862 (Okla. Ct. 
App. 1979) indicates: 
When the property completely loses 
its identity and is not traceable 
because it is co-mingled with other 
property then the rule should not be 
followed. 
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and further, citing to Hussey v. Hussey, 312 S.E.2d 267 
(S.C. Ct. App. 1984) as follows: 
Or when the acquiring spouse places 
title in their joint names in such a 
manner as to evidence an intent to make 
it marital property. 
In reviewing the current case at hand, testimony by 
both parties indicated the property of the Appellant was not 
consumed nor used for family purposes nor co-mingled, nor 
was its identity or traceability lost, nor was it placed in 
joint names in such a manner as to evidence an intent to 
make it marital property such that the rule of property 
acquired by gift or inheritance by one spouse should be 
awarded to that spouse on divorce should apply. 
The Utah Supreme Court at page 308 in Mortensen follow-
ing the other cases cited above dealing with inherited 
property or property given by gift held as follows: 
• •.We conclude that in Utah, trial 
courts making "equitable" property 
divisions pursuant to § 30-3-5 shouLd, 
in accordance with the rule prevailing 
in most other jurisdictions and with the 
division made in many of our own cases, 
generally award property acquired by one 
spouse by gift and inheritance during 
the marriage (or property acquired in 
exchange thereof) to that spouse, 
together with any appreciation or 
enhancement of its value, unless (1) the 
other spouse has by his or her efforts 
or expense contributed to the enhance-
ment, maintenance, or protection of that 
property, thereby acquiring an equitable 
interest in it, cites omitted, or (2) 
the property has been consumed or its 
identity lost through co-mingling or 
exchanges or where the acquiring spouse 
has made a gift of an interest therein 
to the other spouse. cites omitted. An 
exception to this rule would be where 
part or all of the gift or inheritance 
is awarded to the non-donee or non-heir 
spouse in lieu of alimony as was done in 
Weaver v. Weaver. The remaining proper-
ty should divided equitably between the 
parties as in other divorce cases, but 
not necessarily with strict mathematical 
equity. cites omitted. However, in 
making that division the donee or 
heir-spouse should not lose the benefit 
of his or her gift or inheritance by the 
trial court's automatically or arbi-
trarily awarding the other spouse an 
equal amount of the remaining property 
which was acquired by their joint 
efforts to offset the gifts or inheri-
tance. Any significant disparity in the 
division of the remaining property 
should be based on an equitable ratio-
nale rather than on the sole fact that 
one spouse is awarded his or her gifts 
or inheritance. The fact that one 
spouse has inherited or donated proper-
ty, particularly if it is income produc-
ing, may properly be considered as 
eliminating or reducing the need for 
alimony by that spouse or as a source of 
income for the payment of child support 
or alimony (where awarded) by that 
spouse... These rules will preserve and 
give effect to the right that married 
persons have always had in this state to 
separately own and enjoy property. It 
also accords with the normal intent of 
donors or deceased persons that their 
gifts and inheritances should be kept 
within their family and succession 
should not be deferred because of a 
divorce. 
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The Utah Supreme Court then goes on to find that the 
stipulated division of property exclusive of the inheritance 
was an equitable division for reasons distinguishable from 
the immediate case at hand. Mr. Mortensen was granted all 
of the stock interest and one-third of the property division 
while Mrs. Mortensen was given none of the stock interest 
but two-thirds of the marital assets. The Utah Supreme 
Court found this to be an equitable division due to the fact 
that the gross salary of Mr. Mortensen was $2,560.00 
compared to the salary or income of Mrs. Mortensen which was 
$1,300.00, and based on the fact that there were still three 
minor children living at home with Mrs. Mortensen and that 
she had not been awarded any of Mr. Mortensen1 s retirement 
and she had specifically despite the disparity in their 
educational achievement and earnings waived all right to 
alimony and agreed to a payment of $150.00 per month as and 
for child support for each of the three minor children in 
her custody. 
The immediate case at hand has facts distinguishable 
from those of Mortensen. There are no minor children to be 
considered, Mrs. Burt has not waived her right in interest 
to alimony, there is a disparity in their incomes of 
$851.00, Mr. Burt is the party actually receiving a portion 
of Mrs. Burt's inheritance and/or interest earned on 
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inheritance, while he has the greater income. A careful 
review of the transcript and the Exhibits would indicate 
that the parties essentially agreed that the inheritance 
assets acquired by the Appellant were never co-mingled, they 
were specifically maintained in separate personal checking 
account of Mrs. Burt, the original property interest or 
monies obtained were by inheritance directly to Mrs. Burt, 
and any enhancement or maintenance or protection of the 
property was strictly by Mrs. Burt without any assistance by 
Mr. Burt. 
The Trial Court found that the Plaintiff did pay 
mortgage payments, utility payments and grocery payments, 
but also found contrary to the weight of the evidence that 
the Defendant expended her money as she pleased. The Trial 
Court did find that the money as demonstrated by the Exhib-
its which the Respondent earned from his watch repair 
business was used in his private use and was totally unac-
counted for. The Appellant gave a full accounting on the 
use and traceability of her inheritance and the interest 
earned thereon. 
The great weight of the evidence as testified to by the 
Appellant would demonstrate her contributions to the home in 
its upkeep and structural additions and repairs in replacing 
carpeting, in painting, and maintenance. Those 
contributions by the great weight of the evidence should be 
equivalent to the payments made by the Respondent if such an 
equalization is even necessary based on the generally 
greater and rarely equal income of the Respondent and the 
greater potential for contribution by the Respondent to the 
living expenses of the parties. The Appellant resisted 
co-mingling inheritance assets to maintain their separate 
status as obviously was the intent of those giving the 
inheritance to maintain the sanctity and normal intent of 
donors or deceased persons that these gifts or inheritances 
be kept within the family and through that succession that 
they not be diverted because of a divorce. 
Admittedly the economic and financial arrangement of 
the parties was somewhat unique but only because the intent 
of the Appellant due to difficulties in the past with 
obtaining monies from the Respondent was to adequately, 
respectfully and admittedly maintain any and all inheritance 
and its enhancement as a separate non-marital asset which 
actions are now being used to penalize the Appellant with an 
award to the Respondent of 100% of the marital home, 100% of 
the marital savings accounts and all as an offset against 
the Appellant's purchase of a home in 1987 for an equivalent 
value of $65,000.00 and other earnings. 
Interestingly enough, the Respondent was awarded 100% 
of his interest in his mother !s home as an inheritance or 
one-half of that home as shared with his brother with no 
offset allowed against the property awarded to the Appellant 
when in fact based on the testimony given by the Respondent: 
the interest of the Respondent's mother fs home had been 
awarded to the two brothers and their wives as joint ten-
ants, such that that property through co-mingling or an 
exchange was actually one-half a marital asset. 
The only exception according to Mortensen to the rule 
of awarding property acquired by one spouse by gift and 
inheritance during the marriage to that spouse together with 
any appreciation or enhancement of its value other than 
contributions by the non-inheriting spouse or a co-mingling 
or exchange of its identity as if part or all of the gift or 
inheritance is awarded to the non-donee or non-heir spouse 
in lieu of alimony, as was done in Weaver. This does not 
constitute the facts in the immediate case at hand but 
actually quite to the contrary. The donee or heir rather 
than the non-donee or non-heir was awarded alimony after a 
portion of the Appellant's inherited properties were awarded 
to the non-donee or non-heir spouse. Mortensen indicates 
that the fact that one spouse has inherited or donated 
property, particularly if it is income producing, may 
properly be considered as a eliminating or reducing the need 
for alimony by that spouse or as a source of income for the 
payment of child support or alimony (where awarded) by that 
spouse. Again, such is not the case in the immediate case 
at hand. The facts would indicate that inherited property 
was taken away or at least offset against obvious marital 
assets and an award of alimony made payable to the 
heir-spouse making contrary to the intent of Mortensen. 
Based on the above and foregoing case law and the facts 
as applied in this case, the Trial Court did abuse its 
discretion in its property division by considering the 
ncn-co-mingled and traceable separate inheritance properties 
of the parties in its final award or division of property. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING TO THE APPELLANT THE SUM OF 
$300.00 AS AND FOR ALIMONY AFTER FINDING 
AN $851.00 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE INCOME 
OF THE APPELLANT AND THE RESPONDENT. 
This Court in Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah 
App. 1988) considered once again the issue of alimony and 
its purpose where it held at page 958: 
The purpose of alimony is to 
"equalize the standard of living for 
both spouses, to maintain them at their 
present standard as much as possible, 
and avoid the necessity of one spouse 
receiving public assistance" . cites 
omitted. In setting an award of 
alimony, the trial court may exercise 
considerable discretion, and an award 
will not be overtuned absence showing a 
clear and prejudicial abuse of dis-
cretion. Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 97, 
100 (Utah 1986); Eames v. Eames, 735 
P.2d 395, 397 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
Stevens further held: 
In exercising its discretion in 
determining the amount of alimony to be 
awarded, the trial court must consider 
the financial condition and needs of the 
spouse claiming support, the ability of 
that spouse to provide sufficient income 
for him or herself, and the ability of 
the responding spouse to provide the 
support. cites omitted. Failure to 
consider these factors constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. 
This Court further found that "the Utah Supreme Court 
has clearly held that the Trial Court must make findings on 
all material issues." See Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 
(Utah 1987). "These findings !should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue 
was reached'." Quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 
1338 (Utah 1979) . 
In the immediate case at hand, the Memorandum Opinion 
of the Trial Judge stated "the Court finds the income of the 
Plaintiff to be $1,966.00; the Defendant's income is 
^1,115.00, a disparity of $851.00 to the favor of the 
Plaintiff. In order to equalize both the disparity in 
property and income, the Court awards the Defendant an 
alimony of $300.00." 
Sidelining the issue of the retirement which is a 
marital asset and counted as the income of the Plaintiff, 
the Trial Court- must first consider the financial condition 
and needs of the spouse claiming support. The Court failed 
to make any findings of fact concerning the needs of the 
spouse claiming support and simply found her income to 
represent $1,115.00. 
Secondly, the Trial Court must consider the ability of 
the Appellant to provide sufficient income for herself. 
Although the Trial Court did consider the income of the 
Appellant to be that of $1,115.00, the Court did fail to 
assess or make findings as to her ability to provide suffi-
cient income for herself. Thirdly, the Trial Court must 
consider the ability of the responding spouse to provide the 
support. The Court did find the income of the Plaintiff to 
be $1,966.00 which was a disparity compared with the Defen-
dant's income of $851.00 and awarded $300.00 in alimony to 
equalize the disparity in both the property award and the 
income. 
Taking into consideration the arguments concerning the 
abuse of discretion of the Trial Court in awarding property 
division, this could interplay and in and of itself require 
a reconsideration and reanalysis of the award of alimony, as 
it was based in equalization on both the disparity in 
property and income and on that basis alone should be 
reconsidered. Further analysis would indicate that the 
Court did abuse its discretion in not following the three 
factors required in Paffel, supra, and as considered by this 
Court in Stevens, supra, and should remand this case for 
further consideration of those factors and appropriate 
findings of fact regarding those three factors. 
Accordingly, this Court by its own authority as done in 
earlier cases, should remedy the abuse or in the alternative 
remand this case for further findings of fact and reanaly-
sis, especially in light of the abused discretion in enter-
ing the property division. 
POINT III. 
THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL. 
This Court in the recent case of Rasband v. Rasband, 
752 P. 2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988) found that under the Utah 
Code Annotated § 30-3-3 that on remand the Trial Court 
should also determine the Appellant's need for Respondent's 
payment of her attorney's fees incurred in the appeal and 
that if a financial need were adequately shown that the 
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Trial Court could take evidence regarding a reasonable fee 
in making such an order pursuant to that statute. 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3 and Heltman v. 
Heltman, 511 P.2d 720 (Utah 1973) this Court should consider 
and assess attorney's fees and costs incurred in bringing 
this appeal and so order. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court did abuse its discretion in its divi-
sion of the marital assets with an inclusion of inheritance 
assets and in its award of $300.00 a month as and for 
alimony by failing to enter adequate findings of fact, 
failing to -Follow mandates of this Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court, and by finding facts contrary to the weight 
of the evidence as cited above. Accordingly the case should 
be remanded for additional findings of facts and for guide-
lines from this Court with evidence allowed as to attorney's 
fees and costs incurred in bringing this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3^ day of November, 
1989. 
VffiPB^ N. VLAfiOS 
Attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID BURT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BETTY MAE BURT, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 99018 
The Court finds facts for the defendant and grants her a 
divorce upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences to become 
final upon entry. 
The Court awards to each party their personal effects 
and the personal property in their possession and finds values 
in accordance with the appraisal with a few exceptions. 
In addition, the Court awards the violin (value $6,500) 
and the coin collection (value $1,250), to the defendant for a 
total personal property award of $14,340. 
The Court finds plaintiff's personal property value to 
be $6,694, plus the Oldsmobile (value $1,800), and an outboard 
motor (value $150) for a total award of $8,644. 
The Court finds the value of the plaintiff's watch 
repair equipment to offset the value of the collectibles of the 
defendant. 
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Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 99018 
The Court finds there were additional items of value 
sold by the plaintiff: the boat, Toyota truck, etc.f but finds 
their value included in the bank accounts. If they are not 
included in those accounts, the Court orders an equal division. 
There appears to be no substantial debts beyond normal 
living expenses; and the Court accordingly orders each to pay 
their own obligations. 
The marital financial arrangement of the parties was 
unique. It began somewhat innocently with the defendant becoming 
employed part time with minimal salary. The plaintiff would pay 
all of their living expense and she would spend her money as she 
pleased. This money was to be offset by his use of the watch 
repair money for his private use. 
The arrangement continued on through the marriage, even 
after the defendant was working full time, and, in some years, 
equaling his income; and after she had inherited a substantial 
sum from her parents. While it is true she did contribute to the 
household by makling improvements to the home and buying 
furniture, etc., it did create a situation of what was hers was 
hers and what was his was theirs. 
Since this support by plaintiff allowed defendant to 
invest, etc., without encroachment into the funds, the Court 
considers it only fair to allow plaintiff to share in that 
increase. 
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The Court awards to plaintiff the family residence 
(value $65,000)f his accounts (value $28,509) and the previously 
discussed personal property for a total value of $102,153, less 
$7,400 (an inheritance), for a net award of $94,753. He is also 
awarded as his separate property a one-half interest in his 
mother's home (also an inheritance)* 
The Court awards defendant her home and all assets 
presently in her possession as her separate property free of any 
interest by the plaintiff. The Court finds the total value of 
that property to be $195,340. The Court deducts $71,600 as her 
separate property not subject to division for a net award of 
$123,740. 
The difference in values is $28,987 to the favor of the 
defendant. 
The Court finds the income of the plaintiff to be 
$1,966; the defendant's income is $1,115, a disparity of $851 to 
the favor of the plaintiff. 
In order to equalize both the disparity in property and 
income, the Court awards the defendant alimony of $300 per month. 
Each party to bear their own costs and attorney's fees. 
Plaintiff to prepare findings, conclusions and decree in 
accordance herewith. 
DATED this J>L day of February, 1989. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ^ day of Februaryf 
1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision was mailed to the following: 
John T. Caine 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Pete N. Vlahos 
Attorney for Defendant 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
>V^ 
PAtJLA CAK&7 Sec re t a ry 
IjJOHN T. CAINE #053 6 o f 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
j ' A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f 
IJ2568 W a s h i n g t o n B o u l e v a r d 
jjOgden, U t a h 8 4 4 0 1 
T e l e p h o n e : 3 9 9 - 4 1 9 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID BURT, 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : 
JiBETTY MAE BURT, : C i v i l No . 9 9 0 1 8 
: D e f e n d a n t . : 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on the 20th day of January, 1989, before the Honorable Stanton M. 
iTaylor, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court, sitting 
"without a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and being 
.represented by counsel, John T. Caine and the Defendant appearing 
ij 
ijin person and being represented by counsel, Pete N. Vlahos, the 
Court having heard testimony of the parties and other witnesses, 
together with arguments of counsel and being otherwise fully 
'advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
;| FINDINGS OF FACT 
j 1. That the Plaintiff is an actual and bona fide 
President of Weber County, State of Utah and has been for more 
[than three (3) months prior to the commencement of this action. 
I 2. That Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife, 
having been married on March 5, 1947 in Idaho Falls, State of 
Il 
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Idaho. 
3. That the parties have developed irreconcilable 
differences, thus rendering the continuance of this marriage an 
impossibility. 
4. That there have been two (2) children born as issue 
of this marriage, both of whom have reached the age of majority. 
5. That the value of the real estate and personal 
property of the parties acquired during the marriage was either 
stipulated to by the parties or submitted by an appraisal and the 
Court finds the values in accordance with the appraisals with 
some exceptions. The Court find that by stipulation, the violin 
sis awarded to the Defendant at a value of $6,500 and the coin 
'collection at a value of $1,250 for a total personal property 
award of $14,340. The Court finds that by stipulation, the 
.Oldsmobile is awarded to the Plaintiff at a value of $1,800 and 
joutboard motor at a value of $150 for a total personal property 
award of $8,644. 
6. That the watch repair equipment is awarded to the 
Plaintiff and is found to be of equal value to the collectibles 
which is a term used to define dolls, porcelain figurines and 
other objects de art collected by the Defendant over a number of 
years which are awarded to the Defendant. These items have 
[offsetting values. 
i 
! 7. That the Court finds that the Plaintiff sold a boat 
and a Toyota truck, but determines that the money obtained from 
said sales are included in the bank accounts which will be 
awarded to him as set forth in Paragraph 10. 
8. The Court finds no substantial debt beyond normal 
living expenses and orders each party to pay their own obliga-
tions. 
9. The Court finds that the marital financial arrangement 
of the parties was unique, in that the Plaintiff worked on a full 
time basis during the course of the marriage and paid all of the 
parties1 living expenses. That initially, the Defendant worked 
part-time and would spend her money as she pleased. The Plain-
tiff also had the availability of an additional income from watch 
repair which he used as his separate money. As the marriage 
progressed, the Defendant began to work on a more full time basis 
and as the children were raised and left the home, then began to 
earn income at an equal amount of the Plaintiff. That the 
Defendant did contribute somewhat to the household by making some 
improvements to the home and buying furniture, but Plaintiff 
continued to pay the basic household expenses, including the home 
mortgage, utilities and food for the family. 
10. In 1969 and and again in 1975 the Defendant inherited 
$3,000.00 and in 1976 inherited $3,000, and in 1984 inherited 
$19,600.00 from her parents estate. That during the remaining 
years of the marriage the Defendant invested this money and she 
was allowed to do so without encroachment from the Plaintiff. 
That because Plaintiff's efforts in effect allowed Defendant to 
invest free from any other financial responsibilities, Plaintiff 
is entitled to share in the increased, occasioned by such invest-
ment. Based upon this finding, the Court awards to the Plaintiff 
the family home located at 3502 Polk Avenue, Ogden, 
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jUtah, valued at $65,000, his bank accounts valued at $28,509 and 
•the personal property discussed above for a total value of 
|$102,153, less $7,400 as an inheritance from his parents, for a 
net award of $94,753. Plaintiff is also awarded as his separate 
property his one-half interest in his mother's home. 
11. The Court awards the Defendant the home which she 
purchased and all assets presently in her possession, free and 
clear from any claim of the Defendant and finds the total value 
of this property to be $195,340, less $71,600 as an inheritance 
from her parents, for a net award of $12 3,740, which gives a 
I'differences in value in favor of the Defendant of $28,987. 
' 12. The Court finds a difference in value of the real 
and personal property awarded to the parties of $28,987 in favor 
of the Defendant. 
13. That the Court considers this disparity in property 
'award in analyzing the Plaintiff's and Defendant's present 
financial situation as follows. The Court finds the income of 
jjthe Plaintiff, including his retirement, to be $1,966 and the 
i 
Defendant's income to be $1,115 for a disparity of $851 in favor 
of the Plaintiff. In an effort to equalize incomes and to take 
into account the aforesaid advantage in the property division to 
14. The Court finds that each party is financially able 
to bear their own costs and attorney's fees and each should 
assume and discharge the same and hold the other harmless 
therefrom. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes 
as follows: 
I) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
jl 1. That a Decree of Divorce be granted in favor of the 
Defendant and against the Plaintiff based on the grounds of 
irreconcilable differences, the same to become absolute and final 
upon entry. 
2. That the violin is awarded to the Defendant at a 
value of $6,500 and the coin collection at a value of $1,250 for 
a total personal property award of $14,34 0. That the Oldsmobile 
is awarded to the Plaintiff at a value of $1,800 and outboard 
potor at a value of $150 for a total personal property award of 
|i$8,644. 
I 3. That the watch repair equipment is hereby awarded to 
ij 
fthe Plaintiff which is found to be of equal value to the 
collectibles which is a term used to define dolls, porcelain 
jifigurines and other objects de art collected by the Defendant 
l| 
jjover a number of years is hereby awarded to the Defendant. 
4. That it is hereby ordered that each party pay their 
own obligations. 
5. That the Plaintiff is hereby awarded the family home 
located at 3502 Polk Avenue, Ogden, Utah, valued at $65,000, his 
bank accounts valued at $28,509 and the personal property 
discussed above for a total value of $102,153, less $7,400 as an 
inheritance from his parents, for a net award of $94,753. 
Plaintiff is also hereby awarded as his separate property his 
one-half interest in his mother's home. 
6. That the Defendant is hereby awarded the home which 
she purchased and all assets presently in her possession, free 
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and clear from any claim of the Defendant and finds the total 
i 
value of this property to be $195,340, less $71,600 as an 
inheritance from her parents, for a net award of $12 3,740. 
7. That the Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to 
Defendant the sum of $3 00 per month as and for alimony. 
8. That each party is financial able to bear their own 
costs and attorney's fees and each should assume and discharge 
the same and hold the other harmless therefrom. 
DATED this day of February, 1989. 
STANTON M. TAYLOR 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
PETE N. VLAHOS 
Attorney for Defendant 
J CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
!| 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
jjthe above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
to counsel for the Defendant, Pete N. Vlahos, Attorney at Law, 
2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, postage prepaid this /^ -
day of February, 1989 
v ^f\rrj/,i^ 
PAM PONTIUS; Secretary 
'''JOHN T. CAINE #053 6 of 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
.2568 Washington Boulevard 
:;ogden, Utah 84401 
•[.Telephone: 399-4191 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
ii 
li COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
;! 
!'DAVID BURT, : 
i| : DECREE OF DIVORCE 
li Plaintiff, : 
|; vs. : Civil No. 99018 
liBETTY MAE BURT, : 
D e f e n d a n t . 
The above e n t i t l e d m a t t e r came on r e g u l a r l y f o r h e a r i n g 
on t h e 2 0 t h day of J a n u a r y , 1989, b e f o r e t h e Honorab l e S t a n t o n M. 
•Taylor , one of t h e J u d g e s of t h e above e n t i t l e d Cour t , s i t t i n g 
•wi thout a j u r y , P l a i n t i f f p e r s o n a l l y p r e s e n t and r e p r e s e n t e d by 
c o u n s e l , J o h n T. Caine and Defendant p e r s o n a l l y p r e s e n t and 
^ r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l , P e t e N. V l a h o s , and t h e Court h a v i n g 
jheard t e s t i m o n y of t h e p a r t i e s and o t h e r w i t n e s s e s , t o g e t h e r w i t h 
['arguments of c o u n s e l , and t h e Cour t b e i n g o t h e r w i s e f u l l y a d v i s e d 
';in t h e p r e m i s e s and h e r e t o f o r e s i g n e d and e n t e r e d i t s F i n d i n g s of 
:Fact and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law, NOW ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
ii 
ij 1. That the Defendant is hereby awarded a Decree of 
ii 
•'Divorce from the Plaintiff on the grounds of irreconcilable 
»i , 
jldifferences, the same to become absolute and final upon entry. 
•j 
i' ji 2. That the violin is hereby awarded to the Defendant at 
S j;a value of $6,500 and the coin collection at a value of $1,250 
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for a total personal property award of $14,34 0. That the 
.Oldsmobile is hereby awarded to the Plaintiff at a value of 
|$1,800 and outboard motor at a value of $150 for a total personal 
i 
iproperty award of $8,644. 
3. That the watch repair equipment is hereby awarded to 
the Plaintiff is found to be of equal value to the collectibles 
which is a term used to define dolls, porcelain figurines and 
other objects de art collected by the Defendant over a number of 
years which is hereby awarded to the Defendant. 
j 4. The Court finds no substantial debt beyond normal 
•iliving expenses and orders each party to pay their own 
,;obligations. 
:• 5. That the Plaintiff is hereby awarded the family home 
located at 3502 Polk Avenue, Ogden, Utah, valued at $65,000, his 
bank accounts valued at $28,509 and the personal property 
!;discussed above for a total value of $102,153, less $7,400 as an 
inheritance from his parents, for a net award of $94,753. 
!]Plaintiff is also hereby awarded as his separate property his 
i! 
one-half interest in his mother's home. 
6. That the Defendant is hereby awarded the home which 
she purchased and all assets presently in her possession, free 
,and clear from any claim of the Defendant and finds the total 
Ijvalue of this property to be $195,340, less $71,600 as an 
i; 
[inheritance from her parents , for a net award of $123,740, which 
•jgives a di f ferences in value in favor of the Defendant of 
$28,987. 
7. That P l a in t i f f i s hereby ordered t o pay to Defendant, 
as and for alimony, the sum of $3 00 per month. 
; 8. That each party is hereby ordered to bear their own 
i |costs and attorney's fees and each should assume and discharge 
i , 
ii 
i,the same and hold t h e o t h e r harmless the re f rom. 
DATED t h i s day of Febo?viary, 1989 
STANTON M. TAYLOR 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
/ A -v • i <; 
PETE N. VLAHOS 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I maiLed a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing Decree of Divorce to counsel for the 
Defendant, Pete N. Vlahos, Attorney at Law, 2447 Kiesei Avenue, 
'Ogden, Utah 84401, postage prepaid this ' 7 ^ day of February, 
1989. 
PAM PONTIUS, Secretary 
CO 
S/>\TC Of UTAH 
^ } 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this &)— day of November, 
1989, I mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the above 
and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT by placing same in the U.S. 
Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the following: 
John T. Caine 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
2568 Washington Blvd 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
